Fiscal Renaissance in a Democratic South Africa by Tania Ajam & Janine Aron
 
Fiscal Renaissance in a Democratic South Africa 
 
 
Tania Ajam (AFReC (Pty) Ltd, South Africa) 





South  Africa  has  overcome  adverse  initial  conditions  to  achieve  a  remarkable  fiscal 
transformation since the 1994 democratic elections, held amid uncertainty about its ability to 
maintain  the  rule  of  law  and  resist  populist  spending  pressures.  Constitutionally-based, 
durable and credible fiscal reforms have contained spending and rendered policy at all levels 
of government more transparent and accountable, and more predictable through multi-year 
budgeting.  Extensive  tax reform  and  more  efficient  tax  collection  has  expanded  revenue, 
permitting lower tax rates for both individuals and companies, and personal tax relief. Fiscal 
consolidation  almost  eliminated  the  budget  deficit  by  2005,  and  with  improved  debt 
management, has created a lower and more sustainable debt burden. While highly centralised 
revenue  raising  powers  and  greater  decentralisation  of  expenditure  to  sub-national 
governments created a vertical fiscal imbalance, a strict no-bail out approach helped control 
provincial spending. The fiscal-monetary policy mix has stabilised the macro-economy and 
reduced  uncertainty,  reflected  internationally  in  narrowed  sovereign  risk  spreads  and 
improved  debt  ratings.  However,  micro-service  delivery  in  social  expenditure  has  been 
disappointing  (in  some  cases  due  to  capacity  constraints  rather  than  inadequate  fiscal 
allocations), and a long-term decline in infrastructure investment and capital stock is only 
belatedly  receiving  attention.  The  challenge  is  to  increase  social  and  infrastructure 
expenditure at a sustainable rate and to improve the quality  of service delivery, to avoid 
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1.  Introduction   
 
The democratically-elected African National Congress government assumed office in April, 
1994  amid  great  uncertainty  about  its  ability  to  maintain  the  rule  of  law  and  resist 
unsustainable policies in the face of populist pressures. While dealing with the aftermath of 
the Apartheid era, it embarked simultaneously on a socio-economic transformation project in 
the spirit of the new Constitution. Inherited fiscal conditions presented a rather bleak picture. 
There had been some moves towards broadening the tax base, but nevertheless, aggregate 
fiscal discipline was weak. Escalating government expenditure coupled with weak revenue 
collection  had  created  burgeoning  deficits,  raising  concerns  about  sustainability  and  the 
spectre of a debt trap. Allocative efficiency at a macro level had begun to improve even in the 
apartheid era, with shifts towards increased social spending (Van der Berg, 2001). However, 
allocation  in  sectors  such  as  health  and  education  left  much  to  be  desired.  Operational 
efficiency was particularly weak in the homelands and under-serviced Black areas. On the 
whole, fiscal governance was bedevilled by a lack of transparency and accountability. 
 
South African – as a small, open economy – has also had to respond to the uncertainty and 
volatility  of  globalisation,  and  this  has  curtailed  fiscal  policy  discretion  (Abedian,  1998; 
Calitz,  2000).  Globalisation  has  created  pressures  to  reform  fiscal  policy  institutions  and 
budgetary systems, and also for policy convergence, including deficit reduction, tax reform to 
broaden the tax base (while lowering marginal rates), and the restructuring of public sector 
enterprises. Deviant fiscal behaviour, seen as a signal of unsound economic fundamentals, 
could be penalised by adverse foreign capital flows. Yet the greater integration of capital 
markets and increased international tax competition has constrained sovereign governments’ 
ability to tax capital flows. It has even been suggested that competitive tax reductions could
 
prevent the financing of significant social
 welfare spending, though Hines (2006) maintains 
there is still leverage for increased social expenditures despite greater economic openness. 
 
This paper reviews the policies and outcomes of South Africa’s fiscal reform since 1994, and 
explores the main challenges it has raised. Despite the initial conditions, the South African 
government has achieved a remarkable turnaround in the fiscal position over the decade (see 
also  Horton,  2005).  A  large  and  sustained  fiscal  adjustment  has  been  supported  by  the 
creation of a transparent, constitutionally-compliant intergovernmental fiscal relations system, 
increased quality of fiscal data, and improved budget planning and control at all levels of 
government.  The  reform  of  taxation  policy,  guided  by  an  expert  commission,  and  more 
efficient tax collection under a new revenue service, have produced impressive increases in 
revenues,  permitting  widespread  tax  relief  to  individuals.  Expenditure  constraint  was   2 
exercised initially while the tax system was comprehensively overhauled, promoting a more 
durable  adjustment  (Mackenzie  et  al,  1997).  The  composition  of  the  fiscal  adjustments, 
containing personnel  related  expenditures,  subsidies  and  transfers  while  actually  lowering 
both  company  and  personal  tax  rates,  have  further  enhanced  the  credibility  and  likely 
durability of the reform (Alesina et al, 1998; Alesina and Ardagna, 1998). Aggregate budget 
constraints  have  been  respected  for  both  national  and  provincial  spheres  of  government. 
Medium-term expenditure frameworks have guided expectations, and feasible deficit targets 
have been consistently met, with the conventional deficit falling from 7.3 to under 1 percent 
of GDP between 1992/93 and 2006/06 (Figure 1). Fiscal consolidation and improved debt 
management have lowered national debt from 50 to just over 30 percent of GDP, promoting 
greater sustainability of the debt path. The reduced debt service and large cuts in military 
expenditure  have  released  funds  for  potential  social  expenditure  and  infrastructure 
investment.  
 
Public  finance theory cautions that the longer a response to  a  debt  crisis is deferred, the 
greater  –  and  more  painful  –  the  eventual  adjustment  required  for  solvency.  The  sheer 
magnitude  of  the  fiscal  adjustment  in  relation  to  the  precarious  initial  conditions
1  has 
signalled  the  new  government’s  commitment  to  a  credible  fiscal  policy.  The  Minister  of 
Finance announced in the Budget Speech in February, 2000, that the government had decided 
to set an inflation target range of 3 to 6 per cent for the year 2002. An inflation targeting 
framework  was  successfully  adopted  by  the  South  African  Reserve  Bank,  and  with  the 
support of fiscal policy, targets have been achieved. Monetary policy too is now far more 
predictable, credible and transparent (Aron and Muellbauer, 2007a,b). Together the fiscal-
monetary policy mix has enhanced macroeconomic stability, thereby reducing uncertainty and 
improving the investment climate. The fiscal adjustment has not been without its difficulties, 
however, particularly in micro-service delivery in social expenditure areas (such as education, 
health and housing), while infrastructure spending plans, for instance to ease congestion in 
South Africa’s ports and railways, were instituted ambitiously but far too late.  
 
The outline of the paper is as follows. In section 2, the improved governance of fiscal policy 
with its base in constitutional provisions is discussed. The key fiscal reforms since 1994 are 
summarised in section 3. The performance of national fiscal policy is examined in section 4, 
by means of the trends of the main budget indicators, measures of the cyclically adjusted 
fiscal stance, a comparison of budget projections and actual outcomes, the management and 
                                                   
1 The initial debt to GDP ratio was in fact less than the Maastricht requirement for EU entry. 
The rapid increase in the debt ratio, the budget deficit and the primary deficit, however, gave 
cause for alarm.   3 
sustainability of debt, and, finally, the contribution of fiscal policy to South Africa’s improved 
macroeconomic stability. Section 5 explores the implications of the vertical fiscal imbalance 
created  by  a  combination  of  highly  centralised  revenue  raising  powers  and  increased 
decentralisation of expenditure responsibility to sub-national governments. Section 6 details 
the  trends  in  the  consolidated  government’s  expenditure  priorities,  focusing  on two  areas 
where service delivery has been poor, housing and education. Section 7 concludes. 
 
2.  Improved Governance of Fiscal Policy     
 
In  South  Africa,  unlike  many  other  countries,  the  ideals  of  good  fiscal  governance  are 
constitutionally  entrenched.  The  adoption  of  South  Africa’s  first  Constitution  in  1996
2 
precipitated a paradigm shift in public policy and a restructuring of the public sector. The 
Constitution  required  that  budget  processes  of  all  three  spheres  of  government  promote 
transparency,  accountability  and  effective  financial  management  (sections  215-217). 
Legislation was  mandated to  characterize the  form  of these budgets  and  when they  were 
tabled.  Parliament  was  granted  powers  to  exercise  more  effective  oversight  over  budget 
formulation  and  implementation  (sections  55  and  77),  and  even  to  amend  Money  Bills. 
During the Apartheid era, Parliament’s role was merely to “rubber stamp” the budget.  
 
Prior to the 1996 Constitution, the system of fiscal governance in South Africa was highly 
fragmented, and the wholly inadequate oversight mechanisms resulted in great inefficiencies. 
There were several distinct budgets in the old dispensation, including those of four provincial 
administrations and ten homelands (comprising four notionally “independent states” and six 
notionally “self-governing” territories). Each homeland had, at least on paper, a legislative 
assembly, a political executive and an administration of public servants. These separate public 
services had thus to be merged, consolidated and rationalised, while avoiding breakdown in 
service delivery. The adoption of the Constitution precipitated a complete restructuring into a 
unitary state with three spheres of government: national, nine provincial governments and 283 
local municipalities (down from 784 in the Apartheid era). The Constitution exerted three 
major  influences  on  the  nascent  fiscal  arrangements  of  the  democratic  South  Africa:  the 
impetus  towards  budget  and  financial  management  reform;  the  creation  of  a  fiscally 
decentralised system  of intergovernmental  fiscal relations; and the provision  of justiciable 
socio-economic rights. 
 
                                                   
2 An Interim Constitution was adopted in 1994 and the Final Constitution in 1996.   4 
The  Constitution  required  the  establishment  of  a  National  Treasury  to  apply  recognised 
accounting  practices,  classifications  and  norms  to  ensure  transparency  and  expenditure 
control in each sphere of government, and when financing the deficit through increased public 
debt (section 216). Procurement at each level was expected to be “fair, equitable, transparent, 
competitive and cost-effective” - though preferential allocation in some cases was allowed 
for.
3 The National Assembly of the Parliament was charged with providing mechanisms to 
enforce oversight for greater accountability (chapter 4) and oversight over budget formulation 
and  implementation.  For  greater  provincial  expenditure  control,  provision  was  made  for 
halting  for  up  to  four  months  the  transfer  of  national  funds  to  provinces  in  breach  of 
legislation, pending Parliamentary approval  and a report from the Auditor General.  
 
The  emerging  intergovernmental  fiscal  system  was  influenced  by  the  constitutional 
requirements  for  expenditure  assignment,  revenue  raising  powers  and  intergovernmental 
grants, and borrowing powers. Compared to provincial administrations in the apartheid state, 
under  the  Constitution  the  provinces  have  been  assigned  greater  responsibilities  for  the 
delivery of goods and services, either individually or jointly with national government and/or 
local  governments. For instance  with shared responsibility,  e.g. in primary and secondary 
education and health, the national government sets policy but implementation occurs at a sub-
national level. However, revenue raising powers under the Constitution have remained highly 
centralised. The most productive taxes, such as VAT, personal and corporate income tax, are 
reserved  for  national  government.  Provincial governments  collect  very little  own  revenue 
(section 228) and the income  raised  within the province typically amounts to less than 5 
percent of the provincial budget.
 The Fiscal and Financial Commission, an independent body 
established in terms of the Constitution
4, is required to make recommendations to Parliament 
on equitable allocations to national, provincial and local government from nationally collected 
revenues  in  line  with  their  expenditure  responsibilities  and  functions.  Given  that  the 
provincial governments and municipalities have limited borrowing powers
5, they are highly 
dependent on their share of nationally collected revenue to finance the implementation of 
their constitutionally assigned functions. 
 
                                                   
3  These  include  policies  that  restrict  tendering  for  contracts  to  achieve  targets  for  black 
empowerment or affirmative action employment. 
4 In the 1996 Constitution, the mandate of the Financial and Fiscal Commission is given in 
section  220,  while  the  later  Financial  and  Fiscal  Commission  Act  of  1998  explains  the 
organisation’s structure and functions.  
5  Loans  may  be  made  raised  only  to  finance  capital  expenditure  and  not  for  current 
expenditure. No national government guarantee is available in respect of sub-national claims.   5 
The separation of policy and financing (at national level) and implementation (at provincial 
level) potentially promotes unfunded mandates and complex coordination problems, and this 
important  issue  is  discussed  in  section  5.  Local  governments  are  endowed  with  more 
substantial fiscal capacity, being entitled by the Constitution to impose rates on property and 
surcharges  on  fees  for  services  provided  by  or  on  behalf  of  the  municipality  (e.g.  for 
electricity or sewerage). Prior to 1994, many municipalities were in financially precarious 
positions,  were  badly  managed  with  dysfunctional  systems,  and  did  not  engage  with  the 
communities they were supposed to serve. However, while the 1996 Constitution sketched a 
new vision of developmental local government (chapter 7), and local government has since 
been in a continual state of transformation, there is little evidence of general improvement. 
 
Most other constitutions confer only civil and political rights upon their citizens. The South 
African  Constitution  also  confers  justiciable  socio-economic  rights.  The  Bill  of  Rights 
(sections 7 through 39) details the obligations of the state to ensure progressive realisation of 
the right to  housing (section 26), the right to health care,  food,  water  and social security 
(section 27), and the right to education (section 29). Recent jurisprudence has cast some light 
on the complex issue of impact of socio-economic rights on the fiscal system (Ajam and 
Murray, 2004). Two implications are first, that budgeting and financial management systems 
would  have  to  be  increasingly  output-oriented  rather  than  input-driven;  secondly,  budget 
allocations and central government grants would need to be closely linked to actual service 
delivery outputs. It would not be sufficient for the national government to argue that it met its 
obligations through allocation of sufficient funds for health, education and other forms of 
service delivery.  
 
3.  Fiscal Reforms since 1994   
 
Fiscal  reform  initiatives  were  first  articulated  through  government  macroeconomic 
programmes, the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), launched in January, 
1994, and the Growth Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) strategy of June, 1996. Fiscal 
prudence,  tax  reform  and  increased  transparency  of  administration,  a  reorientation  of 
spending to social sector spending and longer term expenditure planning, were hallmarks of 
both the RDP and the GEAR plans. The fiscal reform strategy has been remarkably consistent 
over  time,  and  can  be  roughly broken  down  into  three  broad areas:  budget  and  financial 
management reform; the creation of the intergovernmental fiscal system; and tax policy and 
administration reforms.  
   6 
The budget and financial management reform imperatives of the 1996 constitution were given 
substance by the Public Finance Management Act of 1999, initiating the move from an input-
oriented expenditure control system towards a more performance oriented system. The Act 
formally established the National Treasury, amalgamating the former departments of Finance 
and State Expenditure. As pointed out by Siebrits and Calitz (2004), the 1999 Act does not 
prescribe numerical fiscal rules, but emphasises “regular financial reporting, sound internal 
expenditure  controls,  independent  audit  and  supervision  of  control  systems,  improved 
accounting standards and training of financial managers, and greater emphasis on outputs and 
performance monitoring”. In 2003, the Municipal Finance Management Act extended such 
budget reforms to local government.  
 
The quality, timeliness and comprehensiveness of fiscal data have much improved since 1994. 
Fiscal data are regularly published in the Budget Review and the Intergovernmental Fiscal 
Reviews.  The  introduction  of the  Medium Term Budget  Policy  Statement  (MTBPS)  from 
December, 1997 has improved debt and cash management strategies. Published annually, the 
MTBPS states the government’s aggregate revenue and expenditure intentions over the next 
three  years,  as  well  as  indicative  figures  on  the  division  of  revenue  among  provincial 
governments. Multi-year budgeting, also used in the UK, had its genesis in the 1999 Act, 
realised through the Medium-Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) in 1998/99, providing 
three-year  rolling  budgets  for  the  national  and  provincial  governments  in  March,  and 
underlying  macroeconomic projections. The intended link between budget reform and the 
roll-out of the intergovernmental fiscal system was clearly articulated: “The introduction of 
three year budgets and their consolidation into resource envelopes is an important step in the 
evolution  of  the institutional  framework  for  intergovernmental  policy  making  and  budget 
planning. The intergovernmental forums of the spending departments will, for the first time, 
have expenditure projections within which to develop and refine the norms and standards for 
service delivery” (Department of Finance, 1997, p5). Since 1999, the budget has been tabled 
before the start of the financial year. A new budget and reporting format was introduced in 
2004,  aligned  with  the  International  Public  Sector  Accounting  Standards  issued  by  the 
International  Federation  of  Accountants,  and  based  on  a  new  standard  chart  of  accounts 
(National Treasury, 2004a, pvii). 
 
Significant milestones in the evolution of intergovernmental fiscal relations have included the 
creation  of  the  Budget  Council  in  1996,  an  intergovernmental  forum  presiding  over  the   7 
revenue  sharing  process
6;  establishing  formula-based  revenue  sharing
7,  based  on 
recommendations  by  the  Financial  and  Fiscal  Commission;  and  promulgation  of  the 
Intergovernmental  Fiscal  Relations  Act  of  1997  that  introduced  predictability  and 
transparency into the intergovernmental budget process.  
 
Tax policy and administration reforms have greatly contributed to broadening the tax base 
and  enhancing  revenue  collection  efficiency.  Shortly  after  the  1994  elections,  the  Katz 
Commission  was  appointed  to  investigate  comprehensive  administrative  and  tax  reforms, 
producing  eventually  9  reports.  Foremost  from  an  organisational  point  of  view  was  the 
creation of an autonomous revenue service to be known as the South African Revenue Service 
(SARS), combining the Inland Revenue and Customs and Excise departments. SARS raised 
audit  capability  through  the  introduction  of  computerised  systems,  enhanced  capacity  to 
investigate and prosecute tax evaders and improved debt recovery procedures. At the same 
time  discriminatory  tax  legislation  was  reviewed  to  further  eliminate  gender  and  racial 
discrimination, and to ensure compliance with constitutional provisions on the right to privacy 
and administrative justice. Some of the tax reforms made between 1994 and 1999 include the 
granting of tax amnesties, the introduction of tax relief for low- and middle-income taxpayers 
and the reduction of the number of income tax brackets. Reforms were made to fringe benefit 
taxation and the taxation of Trusts. Company tax rates and the secondary tax on companies 
(STC, introduced in 1993/94) were reduced, and there was a significant fall in ad valorem 
excise tax rates. A tax on retirement funds was introduced in 1996; and in 2000, a capital gains 
tax was introduced.  Tax incentives were introduced for a limited period in the form of a Tax 
Holiday Scheme and accelerated depreciation allowances. In due course transfer pricing and 
thin capitalisation provisions were incorporated in the Income Tax Act. Several double tax 
treaties with foreign jurisdictions were concluded, and there was also a move from source to 
residence based taxation. 
 
4.  Performance of National Fiscal Policy 
 
 
South Africa since 1994  has  not adopted legislated constraints on fiscal  variables  for the 
national government (i.e. fixed fiscal targets), or numerical rules in the manner of monetary 
policy (Aron and Muellbauer, 2007b). The rationale behind fiscal rules which pre-commit to 
                                                   
6 The Budget Council,  formalised in the Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations Act  of 1997, 
consists  of  the  National  Minister  of  Finance  and  his  nine  provincial  counterparts.  The 
Financial and Fiscal Commission attends Budget Council meetings as an observer.  
7  The  formula  based  revenue  sharing  mechanism  initially  applied  only  to  provincial 
governments, but was extended to local governments in 1998/99.   8 
certain  policies  is  that  they,  in  principle,  trade-off  reduced  policy-setting  freedom  and 
flexibility for greater self-discipline and fiscal credibility. Fiscal rules cannot substitute for 
authentic  government  commitment to  fiscal  discipline,  since  they  can  relatively  easily  be 
circumvented, ignored or abandoned (Kopits and Symansky, 1998). Siebrits and Calitz (2004) 
characterize  the  fiscal  regimes  used  in  South  Africa  as  “target-guided  discretion”  during 
1994-98,  and  “transparency-based  discretion”  thereafter,  with  an  underlying  strong 
commitment  to  fiscal prudence. They  argue  that  the  flexible  nature  of  these  regimes  has 
proved  beneficial  in  a  volatile  external  environment  of  currency  crises,  political 
democratization and strong popular pressure for more expansionary policies. Moreover, the 
limited discretion of fiscal policy has not lost credibility to the Treasury, given its consistent 
fiscal discipline in practice. 
 
4.1  Trends of the main budget indicators 
 
A feature of the first decade from 1994 is that the authorities maintained a fairly tight overall 
fiscal position, despite political pressures or constitutional commitments for some degree of 
expansion, and while operating in a not always favourable external environment. At a national 
level, the considerable fiscal consolidation has been sustained through a mix of expenditure 
cuts, revenue gains - especially from income taxes, and improved administration. Given that 
provincial governments have negligible own revenue sources, the emphasis there was more 
on  expenditure  control,  especially  in  the  wake  of  provincial  overspending  in  1997/98, 
discussed in section 5. Consolidation has been supported by the reforms outlined in section 3. 
In consequence, there has been a significant reduction in the budget deficit, and an improved 
primary balance, reflecting more sustainable debt management (Figure 1). 
 
Early  in  1994,  the  future  government  had  launched  the  Reconstruction  and  Development 
Programme (RDP), which emphasised fiscal adjustment. Shortly after the election success of 
1994, the government announced a targeted reduction in the budget deficit of 2.5 percent of 
GDP  over  five  years,  constant  revenues  as  a  share  of  GDP  and  cuts  in  non-interest 
expenditure.  During  the  early  phase  of  adjustment  under  the  RDP,  the  fiscal  authorities 
established credibility by meeting deficit targets (Table 1). The budget deficit which averaged 
4.3 percent in the decade to 1992/93, and was 7.3 percent of GDP in 1992/93, fell to 5.6 
percent of GDP in 1993/94, declining further in the subsequent three fiscal years to 5 percent 
of GDP in 1996/97. The primary balance achieved a surplus in 1994/95 that was thereafter 
sustained. Revenue increased  from 21.9 to 23 percent of  GDP  from 1993/94 to 1996/97, 
facilitated by the establishment of the South African Revenue Services (SARS). Corporate 
income tax was cut to 35 percent in 1995, and the dividend tax reduced by half. Non-interest   9 
expenditure was essentially constant, averaging 22.6 percent of GDP across these years, with 
expenditure cuts mainly targeting the wage bill, subsidies and some areas of capital spending. 
Poor  management,  however,  saw  significant  provincial  expenditure  overspending  and 
provincial borrowing had subsequently to be suspended in 1998/99. 
 
Fiscal reform and consolidation continued with the introduction of the Growth Employment 
and Redistribution (GEAR) strategy in June, 1996,  which  aimed  for a 3 percent  of GDP 
deficit target within 4  years, and a revenue  ceiling of 25 percent of GDP.  The  first two 
budgets after GEAR first cut the wage bill, and a year later limited civil service wage rises 
and  strengthened  management  in  the  provincial  and  municipal  governments.  Provincial 
performance improved and registered a surplus in 1998/99, and together with revenue gains 
under SARS, the deficit target was easily met in 1998/99. The deficit fell to 3.7 percent in 
1997/98 and then to 2.8 percent in 1998/99, with the primary surplus reaching 3.1 percent of 
GDP in 1999/00 (Table 1). Revenue had climbed to 24.2 percent of GDP by 1998/99, while 
non-interest  expenditure  fell  to  21.3  percent  of  GDP.  The  Medium-Term  Expenditure 
Framework (MTEF) was also introduced in 1998/99, allowing multi-year budgeting. 
 
The  institutional  reforms  governing  revenue  collection  and  expenditure  management  bore 
fruit in the following fiscal years from 1999/00, the latter strengthened by the passing of the 
Public Finance Management Act in 1999 (section 2). By 2002/03, the deficit had fallen to its 
lowest  level  since  the  start  of  reforms,  of  1.1  percent  of  GDP.  Debt  management 
improvements and lower interest rates brought sustained savings on debt service, that were 
redeployed to social and some capital expenditure, bringing the primary surplus to 1.4 percent 
of GDP by 2003/04. The ceiling for revenue to GDP of 25 percent continued to be observed 
until 2005/06. Expenditure cuts continued to focus on the wage bill, with cuts in civil service 
employment phased in from 1998 on. The corporate income tax rate was lowered further to 30 
percent and a capital gains tax was introduced. Worldwide income came under the personal 
income  taxation  net,  but  tax  rates  were  lowered  and  thresholds  adjusted.  In  the  2003/04 
budget and the following two budgets, a larger deficit of 3.1 percent was projected, with plans 
for increased social sector spending (including the provision of HIV/AIDS drugs) and capital 
spending. In the event, the actual deficits were far lower, at 2.3 percent, 1.5 percent and only 
0.4 percent of GDP, respectively, partly due to poor capacity in provincial administrations 
resulting  in  unspent  funds.  The  MTEF  projections  to  2008/09  continue  to  signal  the 
government’s intention to maintain a more expansionary stance.  
 
The  tax  reforms  over  the  last  decade  have  markedly  improved  the  effectiveness  of  tax 
collection and revenue sources have diversified (Table 2). The broadening of the tax base has   10 
permitted considerable tax relief since 1995, of which 85 percent comprised personal income 
tax  relief.  The  declining  importance  of  taxes  on  international trade  and transactions  as  a 
source of revenue reflects the government’s trade liberalisation policies. Value Added Tax 
(VAT) accounted for roughly a quarter of total gross tax revenues from 1986/87 to 2004/05. 
Personal income tax has declined from an average of 41 percent to 34 percent of total gross 
tax revenue, between the periods 1993/94 to 1999/00 and 1999/00 to 2005/06. Concomitantly, 
a greater share was taken by company taxation, and two relatively new taxes, the secondary 
tax on companies (introduced in 1993/94) and the tax on retirement funds. The last decade 
was also characterised by increases in the number of user charges (e.g. toll road fees, hospital 
fees and other direct payments for benefits received). Calitz and Siebrits (2003) have noted 
the redistributive thrust of these charges. 
 
4.2  Cyclically adjusted fiscal measures 
 
To estimate the fiscal stance purely as a result of discretionary fiscal policy, a correction can 
be made for cyclical economic factors that may have affected revenue and expenditure. For 
instance, in periods where output exceeds potential or trend output (that is, where the output 
gap is positive), there will be an enhanced tax take from the increased output and possibly 
reduced expenditures on social benefits due to greater demand in the economy, resulting in an 
overall contraction of the budget deficit.  A simple way to adjust fiscal estimates cyclically is 
to employ a measure of the output gap to adjust revenue and expenditure values relative to 
GDP to the amounts needed to maintain revenue and expenditure at the level of a neutral or 
base  year,  that  is,  a  year  when  potential  and  actual  output  approximately  coincided. 
Subtracting these neutral levels of revenue and expenditure from actual levels of revenue and 
expenditure, gives the revenue stance and expenditure stance, from which the fiscal stance 
can be calculated. 
 
We update the exercise of Horton (2005), estimating potential output for South Africa using a 
Hodrick Prescott filter, but choosing the fiscal year 2000/01 as the reference year when the 
output  gap  was  close  to  zero.
8  The  fiscal stance, shown  in  Table  1,  is  calculated  as  the 
difference  between  the  revenue  stance  and  the  (non-interest)  expenditure  stance,  or  the 
                                                   
8  Horton’s  choice  of  the base  year 1998/99, though  the  output  gap was  close  to  zero,  is 
perhaps less plausible than 2000/01, given the very high interest rates experienced that year 
following an exchange rate crisis, and that induced the lowest real annual growth rate in a 
decade. In 2000/01, the output gap was also close to zero, but more normal macroeconomic 
conditions  prevailed.  Further,  the  new  data  from  the  benchmarking  and  rebasing  of  the 
National Accounts (December, 2004) are used here, and revised budgetary data.   11 
primary balance relative to its neutral value
9. The annual change in the fiscal stance is termed 
the fiscal impulse, and it reveals whether policy tightened (negative impulse) or loosened 
(positive impulse). The revenue or expenditure impulses can reveal the sources of the policy 
change.  Table 1 and Figure 2 suggest that discretionary policy was tightened from 1992/93, 
with the fiscal stance rather positive at the outset, but falling to zero from a combination of 
expenditure cuts and revenue gains by 1998/99. Sharp expenditure cuts are shown by the 
negative expenditure impulse for 1993/94 and 1997/98, when the fiscal impulse was strongly 
negative, and moderate cuts ensued in the following three years. In 1998/99, the impact of the 
establishment of SARS and associated reforms is apparent in a supportive negative revenue 
impulse, and significant negative revenue impulses are also seen in 2001/02, 2004/05 and 
2005/06. The rise in budgeted social and investment spending after 2001/02 loosens the fiscal 
stance, despite the revenue gains.  
 
Comparing  the  output  gap  with  the  fiscal  impulse  (Figure  2)  suggests  that  before  about 
2002/03,  policy  had  been  largely  pro-cyclical  (with  the  exception  of  1997/98),  but  has 
become more counter-cyclical in the most recent years. For instance, when actual output was 
less than potential output (the output gap was negative), before 2000/01, the fiscal impulse 
was  also  negative.  Thus,  when  there  was  excess  capacity  in  the  economy,  fiscal  policy 
continued to be consolidated in the early years, but it relaxed with excess capacity in 2003/04.  
Three years have experienced a fiscal stimulus since 1999/00. 
 
An  alternative  approach  to  distinguish  discretionary  and  cyclical  fiscal  policy,  by  the 
estimation  of  structural  balance  indicators,  has  been  executed by two  sets  of  authors  for 
different  periods  and  assumptions,  Horton  (2005)  and  Swanepoel  and  Schoeman  (2003). 
Horton’s results confirm the above findings of discretionary tightening to 1999/2000 (with the 
exception  of  1996/97),  and  loosening  thereafter,  especially  in  2003/04.  Swanepoel  and 
Schoeman  (2003)  concur  that  fiscal  discretionary  policies  were  frequently  procyclical, 
including fiscal consolidation during a period of slower economic growth in 1993 to 1999. 
 
The degree of fiscal discipline is remarkable in the light of theories of public expenditure, 
such as the Meltzer-Richard hypothesis which posits that, in countries with highly unequal 
income  distribution,  the  extension  of  voting  rights  to  lower-income  groups  is  likely  to 
increase the growth of redistributive public expenditure (Meltzer and Richard, 1981). Black et 
                                                   
9 The assumptions for the calculation of neutral values are that neutral revenue grows at the 
rate of GDP, while neutral non-interest expenditure grows at the rate of trend GDP (as in 
Horton, 2005). One would expect revenue to fluctuate with GDP, but expenditure to move   12 
al (2005, p.97-98) point to two factors that help explain the restraint: some redistribution had 
already occurred prior to 1994; and post-1994 reforms achieved a reallocation of spending 
without significant increases in government’s overall expenditure share. The signalling effect 
for global capital flows alluded to earlier may also have contributed to the fiscal restraint.   
 
4.3  Budget projections and actual outcomes 
 
The deviations of actual revenue, non-interest expenditure and balance measures from budget 
targets, as a percentage of GDP, are also shown in Table 1.  Actual expenditures have usually 
been  close to planned limits, or in some cases have undershot limits. In 2003/04  despite 
intentions to increase spending, actual expenditure was below budgeted, indicating lack of 
spending capacity. By contrast, even when revenue projections were revised upwards in the 
budgets,  these  were  outstripped  by  actual  collections.  The  windfall  tax  revenue  gain  in 
2001/02 translated directly into personal income tax relief the following year.  In 2003/04, tax 
collections fell below budgeted estimates, attributable to lower company profits and customs 
receipts in an environment of muted economic growth. In 2004/05 and especially in 2005/06, 
actual revenues again exceeded estimates, indicating that diminishing returns to tax reform 
had not yet set in. The result has been stronger balance and primary balance outturns than 
budgeted, that in recent  years have amounted to over 1 percent of GDP.  Factors causing 
deviations include fluctuations in the business cycle and periods of both overspending and 
underspending by provincial governments, but mainly over-conservative revenue projections, 
particularly of corporate income tax after 1999.   
 
4.4  Debt management and sustainability 
 
The net borrowing requirement of the main budget is obtained by subtracting extraordinary 
transfers from the deficit on the main budget and adding extraordinary receipts
10. The net 
borrowing requirement is financed through changes in domestic and foreign loan liabilities, 
and changes in cash and other balances.  The consolidation of the fiscal position has helped 
reduce domestic debt from 50 to 34 percent of GDP between 1998/99 and 2005/06 (Figure 3), 
and debt service has correspondingly fallen from 6 to just above 3 percent of GDP. Foreign 
debt remains a small proportion of overall debt, at just above 4 percent of GDP in 2005/06, up 
                                                                                                                                                    
more  smoothly,  since  a  social  benefits  system  is  not  developed  in  South  Africa  (social 
expenditures are planned in advance for means-tested or age-threshold groups). 
10 Extraordinary transfers include premiums received on destination bonds in switch auctions. 
Extraordinary receipts include proceeds of sale of state assets and strategic supplies, as well 
as “book profit” on domestic government bond buy-backs and source bonds issued in source 
auctions.    13 
from about 1 percent of GDP in 1993/94. Foreign debt rose to nearly 8 percent of GDP in 
2001/02,  reflecting increased  borrowing  (at  longer  maturities)  and the  effects  of  the  rand 
depreciation. Debt management has focused on extending the maturities of foreign debt and 
domestic  debt,  consolidating  debt  instruments  and  introducing  inflation-indexed  bonds. 
Increased diversification and an improved term structure of debt have contributed to reduced 
fiscal risk.  
 
Horton (2005) under a range of cautious assumptions
11, projects debt forward from 2004, and 
examines the dynamics under a variety of short-term shocks.  The shocks include a fall in 
growth, substantial real depreciation of the exchange rate, increase of the debt stock and a 
worsening of the primary balance. He finds the projected debt is moderate and sustainable 
over the next decade. 
 
4.5  The  contribution  of  fiscal  policy  to  South  Africa’s  improved  macroeconomic 
stability 
 
South Africa’s growth performance has improved in the last decade relative to the preceding 
decade: real economic growth rate averaged 3.1 percent (1.1 percent per capita) during 1995–
2004,  versus  0.8  percent  (-1.3  percent  per  capita)  during  1985–94.  However,  the  decade 
average remains low by world and South Africa’s own historical standards (Du Plessis and 
Smit, 2007). The combination of tight fiscal and monetary policies may have contributed to 
depressing growth rates, particularly during 1998 (when nominal interest rates rose to over 25 
percent) and 1999. However, the Finance Minister’s decision for the central bank to adopt 
inflation  targeting  from  early  2000  under  a  new  Governor  has  greatly  improved  the 
transparency, credibility and predictability of monetary policy (Aron and Muellbauer, 2007a). 
With better  management  of  interest  rates  under  inflation  targeting  and  reduced  volatility, 
perceived currency and sovereign credit risks have declined, tax-adjusted real interest rates 
are far lower, and consumer price inflation has fallen from double-digit figures in the 1990s to 
well  within  the 3  to  6  percent  target  range  from  late  2003.  The  fiscal  consolidation  and 
improved transparency and predictability of fiscal policy have supported monetary policy: the 
improved coordination of fiscal and monetary policy is a further strength of post Apartheid 
reform. Fiscal constraint has also helped to bolster national savings, as household saving has 
fallen sharply over the decade. In the absence of a counterfactual, a case could be made that 
                                                   
11 The assumptions include revenue remaining below 25 percent of GDP, extra expenditure of 
0.1-0.2 percent of GDP for health (HIV/AIDS treatment), but other non-interest expenditure 
to remain constant, growth at around 3 percent per annum, a constant real effective exchange 
rate and interest rates declining slightly in the medium-term.    14 
growth could have been more severely compromised had the inherited fiscal threat not been 
neutralised  first,  under  the  difficult  conditions  of  currency  volatility  and  low  investor 
confidence.  
 
The  fiscal-monetary  policy  mix  has  created  an  environment  of  macroeconomic  stability 
conducive to future growth (Aron and Muellbauer, 2005). Empirical evidence suggests that 
investment in South  Africa is substantially driven by uncertainty. This is true for private 
sector  physical  capital  augmentation,  for  portfolio  capital  flows  and  for  foreign  direct 
investment (Fielding 2000; Fedderke and Liu, 2002; Fedderke, 2004; Fedderke and Romm, 
2005). With the improvement of the investment climate through greater systemic stability of 
South Africa and improved policy credibility and transparency, lower business costs have 
promoted investment in all three dimensions. However, while a more efficient tax burden may 
have promoted private sector participation in the economy, with low inflation there has been a 
further shift in effective taxation from the personal to the corporate sector
12, and effective 
corporate tax rates remain high by the standards of comparable emerging market countries 
(Aron and Muellbauer, 2005). 
 
Unfortunately,  the  public  capital  constraint  is  only  belatedly  receiving  extensive  policy 
attention  (e.g.  significant  expansions  were  planned  in  the  2005  budget).  In  line  with 
international  evidence, infrastructure in  South  Africa  has  been  found  to  influence  growth 
(e.g., Fedderke, Perkins and Luiz, 2005), with electricity capacity having the greatest and 
most robust impact. Yet there has been a long-term decline in infrastructure investment and 
capital stock, with real investment per capita falling by 72 percent from 1976 to 2002 (Bojetic 
and Fedderke, 2006), that should  have been addressed  earlier. In the  case  of low quality 
education and training, another important long-term constraint on growth, the discussion in 
section 6 suggests that fiscal allocation is only part of the solution to these ills. The issue is 
not the quantum of education expenditure (this is South Africa’s single largest non-interest 
government  expenditure  item  and  it  spends  much  more  than  its  developing  country 
counterparts), but effectiveness and efficiency. 
 
5.  Fiscal decentralisation     
 
The  highly  centralised  nature  of  revenue  raising  powers  in  South  Africa,  with  increased 
decentralisation of  expenditure responsibility,  has  created a vertical  fiscal imbalance. The 
provincial  governments  face  significant  expenditure  mandates,  but  have  restricted  own   15 
financial resources. Provincial governments are highly dependent on the “equitable share” 
grant, regulated by section 214 of the Constitution, to finance the implementation of their 
constitutionally assigned functions. After deducting interest obligations and other statutory 
payments from total tax collected by SARS and other revenues, the balance is “equitably” 
split up among the three spheres of government. The provinces also receive conditional grants 
which they have to earmark for pre-specified purposes, such as health, infrastructure, housing 
and social development. Equitable share allocations and conditional grants comprised roughly 
96  percent  of  all  provincial  revenue  in  2003/4.  The  share  of  overall  nationally  collected 
revenue for national government fell from over 42 percent in 1989/99 to around 37 percent by 
2005/06 for national government, while rising for provincial and especially local government.  
This  increase  in  revenue  for  sub-national  governments  helped  to  finance  their  increased 
expenditure responsibilities. 
 
The  fiscal  federalism  literature  suggests  that  such  a  mismatch  between  revenue  and 
expenditure powers could potentially weaken accountability at the margin and lead to soft 
budget  constraints  at  sub-national  levels,  possibly  even  creating  disincentives  for  raising 
resources  at  the  national  level  (Shah,  1994).  Conventionally,  it  is  suggested  that  the 
assignment of spending responsibility should precede the division of tax powers. However, 
Rao  and  Singh  (1999)  suggest  the  choice  between  assigning  tax  powers  and  providing 
transfers to sub-national governments to finance their services, depends upon the trade-off 
between the additional efficiency loss due to sub-national taxation and efficiency gains from 
cost-efficient spending by them (plus considerations of regional equity). In Australia, Breton 
(1996)  and  Groenewegen  (1979)  argue  that  vertical  fiscal  imbalances  in  fiscal  federal 
arrangements  reflect  rational  economic  motives,  as  the  “high  coordination  costs”  of 
administering  income tax  and some  other taxation  have  required  “high  concentration”  of 
powers. Similarly, Momoniat (2002), one of the architects of the South African fiscal system, 
suggests  that  the  design,  though  departing  from  the  conventional  prescripts  of  fiscal 
federalism theory, has been advantageous. He argues for the maximisation of the revenue 
potential of  existing revenue sources, and phasing in devolved additional taxation powers 
only  after  effective  expenditure  controls  and  efficient  revenue  collection  procedures  are 
firmly in place. The risk of moral hazard could then be contained with a strict no-bail out 
approach by the government, backed by a policy of not guaranteeing sub-national loans or 
deficits.  
 
                                                                                                                                                    
12 Corporations  can  deduct interest  on debt  from taxable profits, while  households cannot 
deduct such interest from taxable income, and interest rates have fallen with lower inflation.    16 
The provincial governments, in aggregate, were substantially in deficit from 1996/97, which 
reverted to a surplus from 1998/99 to 2001/02 (Figure 4). That all provincial governments 
were  affected  to  a  greater  or  lesser  extent  has  suggested  systemic  problems  in  the 
intergovernmental  system.  Under-budgeting  has  been  cited  as  the  main  reason  for  these 
deficits  rather  than  over-spending  (Department  of Finance,  1998:13).  The  lion’s  share  of 
provincial budgets is devoted to personnel related expenditures, linked to delivery of labour 
intensive health and education services, while roughly a third is on social development. This 
introduces rigidity to provincial budgets, since social security benefits are set nationally and 
provinces have very little control over salaries. In 1996/97, the employment of teachers and 
health  personnel  was  expanded  with  improved  remuneration,  as  provincial  governments 
started addressing backlogs in these two areas. Health and education costs rose by 26 and 31 
percent, respectively, from 1995/96 to 1996/97. An inherited incremental budgeting system, 
based  on  the  previous  year’s  budgeted  figures  rather  than  actual  figures,  resulted  in  the 
budgeted  personnel
13  increases  falling  well  below  increases  in  actual  expenditure.  The 
situation  was  compounded  by  bad  financial  management  systems  and  lack  of  effective 
internal controls. Budget  “gaming”  may  also  have  occurred,  where provinces  deliberately 
under-budgeted in the hope of receiving a bail-out from national government.  
 
National government eventually did intervene in terms of section 100
14 of the Constitution, in 
response to this overspending episode. The two most affected provinces (the Eastern Cape 
and KwaZulu-Natal) were bailed out and further funds were distributed to all the provincial 
governments.  There  were  fears  that  this  would  lead  to  a  softening  of  the  provincial 
governments’ budget constraints; however, the bail outs were conditional on improvements in 
financial management and an undertaking by the affected provinces to run budget surpluses in 
1998/99  to  repay  their  debt.  This  took  considerable  political  will,  given  the  fact  that 
KwaZulu-Natal and the Eastern Cape are two of the poorest provinces in South Africa with a 
significant social backlog. A further payment was allocated to provincial governments in the 
1998/99 adjustments budget, conditional  on their agreement to implement debt repayment 
schedules. 
 
The  surpluses  in  1999/00  and  in  2000/01  were  not  solely  a  response  to  debt  repayment 
obligations. They also reflected  an inability to spend budget  allocations, with the binding 
constraint not being purely financial, but rather one of management capacity, especially in 
                                                   
13 Not all civil servants from the ex-homelands had unique identity numbers or were on the 
government payroll system. In addition, “ghost” workers were rife.   17 
relation  to  capital  projects.  The  fiscal  constriction  coupled  with  an  inability  to  spend 
effectively, impacted on service delivery in the Eastern Cape and KwaZulu-Natal between 
1995/96  and  2000/01.  Significantly  lower  growth  rates  resulted  for  social  development 
expenditure  and  education  in  these  two  provinces,  by  comparison  with  other  historically 




A conditional grant for spending on social grants arrears in the 2002/03 financial year was 
transferred at the end of the 2001/02 fiscal year. When this is netted out, the 2001/02 surplus 
declines  significantly.  In  2002/03 and  2003/04,  provincial  governments again  ran  deficits 
(Figure  4).  The  2002/03  deficits  were  planned  and  budgeted  for,  funded  from  the  cash 
balances available to provincial governments after debt payments (National Treasury, 2003, 
p15). The deficits were also driven by increases in transfers, in particular, the child support 
grant.  Of  the  combined  provincial  deficit  in  2003/04,  just  over  half  was  due  to  over-
expenditure  on  social  security grants,  which  had  grown  at  an  annualised  rate  of  over  40 
percent  (National  Treasury,  2004a,  p158).  The  following  two  fiscal  years  again  saw 
provincial surpluses. 
 
It is interesting to reflect on how the costs and benefits of consolidation were apportioned 
between national and provincial levels of government. The benefits would appear to have 
accrued  mainly  at  national  level  (i.e.  greater  aggregate  fiscal  discipline  leading  to  lower 
deficits and hence better country risk ratings and lower costs of borrowing). The provincial 
governments  also  gained  from  fiscal  consolidation  to  the  extent  that  decreasing  interest 
payments freed up more discretionary resources that could be diverted to the social spending 
that comprises most of provincial expenditure. In terms of expenditure control and service 
delivery  forgone,  the  bulk  of  the  costs  would  probably  have  accrued  to  the  provinces. 
Nevertheless, it must be borne in mind that provincial governments probably did not, and 
indeed still do not, have the capacity to spend intergovernmental grants effectively. So even if 
                                                                                                                                                    
14 This allows national government to intervene when a provincial government fails to meet 
an executive obligation. The Eastern Cape government had failed to make welfare payments, 
triggering constitutional court challenges, and had failed to pay creditors.  
15 The horizontal division of the total provincial share to the individual provinces (and of the 
total local government share to individual municipalities) is effected by means of a formula. 
The formula is updated to reflect new census data, typically phased in over time in order to 
avoid undermining the predictability of provincial budgets. This primarily demographically 
driven  formula  is  highly  redistributive.  Between  1998/99  and  2003/4,  of  the  nine  new 
provinces, the Northern Cape’s share has remained fairly constant, the Western Cape and 
Eastern Cape shares have declined, and the shares of the more populous Gauteng, KwaZulu-
Natal and Limpopo have increased.  
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more  funds  were  available,  this  may  not  have  resulted  in  better  quality  infrastructure  in 
previously disadvantaged areas or the recruitment of more skilled personnel to those areas. 
 
What implications do these outcomes hold for the political economy of South Africa and the 
balance of power between the provincial and federal levels of government? The bottom line is 
that while South Africa has done exceptionally well in stabilising the macro-economy, the 
microeconomic  objectives  still  require  concerted  focus.  The  creation  of  the  provincial 
governments was not driven by economic motives, but primarily political motives. There is 
now  concern  about  the  future  of  provincial  governments,  especially  those  that  are  not 
delivering. One proposal has been to amalgamate provincial governments (e.g. Northern Cape 
and Western Cape; or Mpumalanga, Gauteng and Limpopo back into the old “Transvaal”). 
An  alternative  suggestion  is  to  disestablish  provincial  legislatures,  turning  provincial 
governments  back  into  administrative  arms  only.  Unfortunately,  the  creation  of  the  nine 
provincial legislatures created political rents for governing party elected members who could 
not get onto the national party list, and resistance could be expected from this vested interest 
group. On the other hand, political pressure in response to poor service delivery is mounting. 
This  may  encourage  the  national  government  to  “re-centralise”  policy  influence  over 
provincial functions by reducing the fiscal autonomy to provincial governments in the grant 
system. This could be done by making large unconditional grants (like the equitable share 
grants) conditional. 
 
6.  Consolidated government’s expenditure priorities 
 
South  Africa  inherited  a  highly  unequal  wealth  and  income  distribution  and  a  legacy  of 
decades-long  discriminatory  provision  in  health,  education  and  infrastructure  across 
population groups. The reorientation of spending away from defense and subsidies, and a 
reduced  debt  burden  through  improved  debt  management,  has  freed  spending  for  social 
purposes,  under  the  constraint  of  the  overall  fiscal  targets.  Consolidated  national  and 
provincial  figures  give  an  indication  of  the  changing  priorities  accorded  to  expenditure 
categories. “Social services” jointly consume the bulk of non-interest consolidated national 
and provincial expenditure, averaging just below 60 percent of total expenditure (Table 3). 
Education expenditure at 22 percent is the single largest expenditure item of this category, 
followed  by  social  development  and  health.  Social  welfare  expenditure,  which  includes 
means-tested child support grants, disability grants and universal old age grants, is expected 
to increase to 18.5 percent of non-interest expenditure over the MTEF period, with health and 
education falling in importance to 11.8 and 20.7 percent, respectively (Table 3).  
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We  focus  in  detail  on  two  categories,  education  and  housing,  to  illustrate  some  of  the 
achievements and constraints in social spending. Table 3 shows that in annual growth terms, 
real housing expenditure actually declined by 31 percent between 1997/98 and 1999/00, and 
grew by only 6.8 percent between 1999/00 and 2005/06 (although expected to increase to 11.3 
percent  over  the  MTEF  period).  The  decline  may  reflect  capacity  constraints  to  spend 
effectively, owing to factors as non-availability of suitable land, inadequate coordination with 
municipalities in respect of the delivery of complementary basic services (such as water and 
electricity), uncoordinated policies  and constraints  on financing (National Treasury, 2003, 
p174). In 2002/03, for example, only 76 percent of budgeted Housing Subsidy Grants were 
spent. While the North West and the Western Cape provinces spent all available funds, the 
Eastern Cape only spent 37 percent of available funds, and the Northern Cape, 65 percent 
(National Treasury, 2003, p162). This inability to spend resulted in rollovers, with some 71 
percent of housing funds rolled over in 1995/96, 20 percent in 2000/01 and 12 percent in 
2001/02 (National Treasury, 2003, p163). Although 1,614,512 houses had been built by the 
end of 2003/04 (National Treasury, 2004a, p125), the rate of delivery has been insufficient to 
meet  a  housing  backlog  estimated  at  2,406,747  units  using  Census  2001  data  (National 
Treasury, 2003, p127). Moreover, a rising number of low income households is increasing the 
backlog  (National  Treasury,  2004b,  p127).  With  falling  household  sizes  (3.8  people  on 
average in 2001 compared with 4.5 in 1996), the number of households increased by 4.7 
percent per annum during 1996-2001, faster than the annual population growth rate of 2.1 
percent. Given the Grootboom judgement of October, 2004
16 by the Constitutional Court of 
South  Africa,  which  clarified  the  test  for  “reasonableness  for  evaluating  progressive 
realisation” of housing provision, this situation is a cause for concern. 
 
The divergence of private and social benefits is largest in basic education. The social rate of 
return to primary  education is generally  far  higher than that of post-primary  education in 
many developing countries. South Africa is one of the highest spenders on education among 
middle income countries in terms of GDP per capita and as a percentage of total expenditure. 
Nevertheless, the quality of the educational outcomes is significantly inferior to comparable 
developing  countries.  This  is  partly  explained  by  substantial  infrastructure  backlogs, 
inadequate access to learner support materials, unqualified teachers (especially in the crucial 
areas  of  mathematics  and  science)  and  low  funding  of  adult  basic  education  and  early 
childhood  development.
17  Improved  quality  of  education  is  reflected  in  raised  secondary 
school certificate pass rates and university entrance passes, according to the Department of 
Education (2004, p7). The matriculation pass rate indeed increased from 47 to 71 percent 
                                                   
16 Republic of South Africa v. Grootboom, Case No. CCT 11/00.    20 
between  1997  and  2004  (National Treasury,  2005b).  However,  mathematics  higher  grade 
passes are probably a better indication of educational quality. Although increasing marginally, 
these have remained low, especially in provinces such as the Eastern Cape (4 percent) and 
Limpopo (5 percent). South Africa has participated in three cross-national studies of quality 
and  achievement
18  with  disconcerting  results.  In  the  Third  International  Mathematics  and 
Science Study, South Africa scored below the international average for the 38 countries that 
participated in the study; for both mathematics and science it scored well below countries 
with comparable economic and education profiles, such as Tunisia, Chile and the Philippines 
(Department of Education, 2004). 
 
Reduced  disparities  in  funding  allocation  appear  not  to  have  reduced  the  variability  of 
educational outcomes across provinces. Van der Berg (2007) finds that large differentials in 
performance  among  black  schools  cannot  be  attributed  to  socio-economic  background  or 
teaching resources, but rather to school management and the functioning of the schooling 
system. He concludes that additional fiscal resources on their own can only make a limited 
contribution to enhancing educational outcomes. Ensuring that poor schools have access to 
qualified teachers and better school management is not merely a fiscal problem, but a social 
problem with complex dimensions of location (rural/urban, city/township), language, race and 
union opposition to salary differentiation (Van der Berg, 2007). 
 
7.  Conclusion    
 
South  Africa  has  overcome  adverse  initial  conditions  and  achieved  a  remarkable  fiscal 
transformation over the last decade through adopting durable, credible and well-coordinated 
reforms, outlined in earlier sections of this paper. Allsopp and Vines (2005) maintain there is 
an active role for fiscal
 policy in flexible inflation targeting
 regimes in setting the policy mix 
and in managing
 shocks and imbalances. The fiscal-monetary policy mix in South Africa has 
created  an  environment  of  macroeconomic stability  conducive  to  future  growth.  Inflation 
targeting  was  successfully  introduced  and  the  restrained  fiscal  stance  and  improved  debt 
management has helped support a low inflation monetary policy. Consumer price inflation 
fell from double-digit figures in the 1990s to well within the target range from late 2003. 
Lower and more predictable inflation and interest rates have helped contain business costs, 
while greater fiscal and monetary policy credibility and transparency has reduced uncertainty 
                                                                                                                                                    
17 Similar types of constraints occur within the health sector. 
18 The “Third International Mathematics and Science Study” (Repeat) or TIMMS (R), “The 
Monitoring of Learning Achievement” (MLA) project and “The Southern African Consortium 
for Monitoring Quality” (SACMEQ).   21 
in  the  economy.  South  Africa’s  international  economic  standing  has  been  enhanced, 
evidenced by reduced sovereign risk spreads and improved debt ratings.  
 
There are other complementary fiscal measures on households that could facilitate the work 
of the central bank. An example is well-designed property and land taxes. These could help 
contain  the  sharply  rising  debt-to-income  ratios  under liberalised  credit  markets  in  South 
Africa, partly driven by rising house and land prices, and which fuel consumption (Aron and 
Muellbauer, 2005). Another instance is redressing the recent under-funding of Statistics South 
Africa by the Treasury due to cost-cutting. This has proved misguided and costly in terms of 
reliable historical data on which to base monetary policy formulation (though this issue is 
belatedly receiving attention). 
 
The  undoubted  macro-stability  gains  contrast  sharply  with  poor  delivery  at  the  micro-
economic level.  The fiscal strategy underpinning the GEAR macro-programme was based on 
two major objectives. The first was a deficit reduction strategy, aimed at curtailing the growth 
of  interest  obligations,  combating  inflation  and  freeing  up  resources  for  investment  in 
infrastructure and  human  capital. The second pillar  was the budget  reform programme to 
strengthen redistribution. The underlying rationale seems to have been that even though the 
quantum  of  expenditure  would  decline,  this  would  be  offset  by  the  enhanced  equity, 
efficiency and effectiveness in the way these resources were used. While the former objective 
has been attained, the latter has, at best, only been partially achieved. International reform 
experience cautions that the benefits of budget reforms such as the medium term expenditure 
framework,  performance  based  budgeting  and  accruals  only  manifest  themselves  over  an 
eight to ten year horizon. The sheer magnitude of the budget reform project was probably 
underestimated  by  the  incoming  government,  both  because  the  degree  and  scope  of 
dysfunction in the inherited apartheid fiscal machinery could not have been fully ascertained 
then, and given the magnitude of the economic development problems facing South Africa. 
The timing and synchronization of the costs and benefits of these two strategies has also 
proved problematic. Deficit reduction created immediate, concentrated costs to society, with 
its (uncertain) benefits only to be realised in the future. There were also substantial set-up 
costs associated with the budget reform
19, and thereafter, incremental maintenance costs. The 
near term adjustment has therefore been painful: the full costs of deficit reduction but few of 
                                                   
19 These include design and implementation of promulgation of new legislative frameworks,  
new  accounting  and  management  information  systems,  other  IT  infrastructure  such  as 
networks, creation of new institutional structures (e.g. audit committees, risk management 
committees),  recruitment  of  additional  personnel,  training of  existing  and  new  personnel, 
systems  integration  costs  (marrying  financial  and  non-financial  information),  and  other 
compliance costs to public sector organisations.   22 
its  benefits;  some  of  the  costs  of  budget  reform,  with  diffused  benefits  expected  mainly 
towards the end of its implementation.  
 
The  hard-won  sustainability  of  fiscal  policy  might  be  threatened  in  the  future.  Reduced 
revenue  collection  windfalls  coupled  with  fiscal  risk  from  the  existing  social  security 
entitlements will have to be carefully managed. In addition, mediocre improvements in the 
quality  and  scope  of  actual  service  delivery  and  the  continuing  dearth  of  management 
capacity  for delivery, in a  context  of an increasing  number of  households, the ravages of 
HIV/AIDS,  improvements  in  economic  growth  insufficient  to  substantially  lower 
unemployment and persisting poverty, inequality and deprivation, could mean the government 
will face increasing pressure to extend existing cash-based entitlements. Lobbying in recent 
years for the proposed introduction of a universal Basic Income Grant is a case in point. 
Political sustainability of policies is at least as important as fiscal sustainability. Further, a 
long-term decline in infrastructure investment and capital stock is only belatedly receiving 
attention. The challenge for South Africa is to increase social and infrastructure expenditure at 
a sustainable rate and to enhance the quality of service delivery, to avoid undermining the 
impressive fiscal stability gains at the macroeconomic level.  
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Figure 1: Conventional and primary balances as a percentage of GDP, fiscal years from 1989/90 





Total revenue to GDP  Total expenditure to GDP 





Overall balance to GDP  Primary balance to GDP 
 
Source: South African Reserve Bank, Quarterly Bulletin. 
Note: The fiscal year ends in March, and hence, the year 1990 would refer to 1989/90. 
 
















Fiscal impulse in percent of GDP  Output gap in percent of trend output 
 
 
Source: Calculations using data from South African Reserve Bank, Quarterly Bulletin 
Note: See details in text and under Table 1   26 
Figure 3: Debt indicators, fiscal years from 1989/90 
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Source: South African Reserve Bank, Quarterly Bulletin 
 
 
Figure 4: Provincial and local governments’ deficits and surpluses, fiscal years from 1991/92 
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Source: South African Reserve Bank, Quarterly Bulletin 
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Table 1: Fiscal indicators and cyclically adjusted fiscal estimates 
  1992/93  1993/94  1994/95  1995/96  1996/97  1997/98  1998/99  1999/00  2000/01  2001/02  2002/03  2003/04  2004/05  2005/06 
Main budget indicators (in percent of GDP) 
Revenue  21.8  21.9  22.5  22.5  23.0  23.4  24.2  23.7  22.6  23.6  23.3  23.3  24.5  26.3 
Expenditure  29.1  27.4  27.1  27.7  27.9  27.1  26.9  25.8  24.6  25.0  24.3  25.7  26.0  26.7 
Non-interest 
expenditure  24.7  22.8  22.4  22.5  22.7  21.5  21.3  20.6  19.7  20.5  20.4  22.1  22.5  23.4 
Interest  4.3  4.6  4.7  5.2  5.2  5.5  5.6  5.3  4.9  4.5  3.9  3.6  3.4  3.3 
Balance  -7.3  -5.6  -4.6  -5.1  -5.0  -3.7  -2.8  -2.1  -1.9  -1.4  -1.1  -2.3  -1.5  -0.4 
Primary balance  -3.0  -0.9  0.1  0.0  0.3  1.9  2.9  3.1  2.9  3.1  2.8  1.3  1.9  2.9 
Nominal GDP 
(R billions)  381  443  497  564  636  700  753  837  952  1050  1198  1281  1420  1562 
Deviations from budget targets (in percent of GDP) 
Balance              0.4  0.9  0.5  1.0  0.8  0.0  1.5  2.7 
Primary balance               0.5  0.6  0.5  0.9  0.8  -0.4  1.4  2.6 
Revenue              0.7  0.8  0.5  1.4  1.1  -0.4  1.4  2.6 
Non-interest 
expenditure 
           
0.2  0.2  0.1  0.5  0.4  0.0  0.1  0.1 
Measuring fiscal stance 
Potential/actual 
GDP  1.030  1.017  1.002  1.000  0.981  0.988  1.009  1.005  0.997  1.004  1.000  1.010  0.999  0.994 
Fiscal stance  5.3  3.5  2.8  2.9  3.1  1.3  -0.1  -0.3  0.1  -0.2  0.1  1.5  1.0  0.2 
Revenue stance  0.9  0.8  0.2  0.1  -0.3  -0.8  -1.5  -1.1  0.0  -1.0  -0.6  -0.7  -1.8  -3.7 
Non-interest 
expend. stance  4.4  2.8  2.7  2.8  3.4  2.1  1.4  0.8  0.1  0.7  0.7  2.2  2.8  3.8 
Fiscal impulse    -1.8  -0.7  0.1  0.2  -1.8  -1.4  -0.2  0.4  -0.3  0.4  1.4  -0.5  -0.9 
Revenue impulse    -0.1  -0.6  -0.1  -0.4  -0.4  -0.8  0.5  1.1  -1.0  0.3  -0.1  -1.1  -1.9 
Non-interest 
expend. impulse    -1.7  -0.1  0.1  0.6  -1.3  -0.7  -0.6  -0.7  0.7  0.0  1.4  0.7  1.0 
Source: Calculations using data from South African Reserve Bank, Quarterly Bulletin   28 




























































































































































Average percent contribution of revenue sources to total main budget tax revenue/% 
 
1986/87 - 1993/94
 a  34.3  19.7  0.1  0.0  1.6  25.1  5.5  6.5  7.2 
1993/94  - 1999/00
 a  41.0  12.1  1.1  1.5  1.7  24.7  7.2  4.1  6.6 
1999/00 - 2005/06  33.7  18.4  2.3  1.9  2.1  25.9  5.3  3.6  6.7 
2005/06 – 2008/09
 h  29.7  20.8  3.0  0.5  2.2  28.4  4.3  5.1  6.1 
Average annual nominal growth rates of revenue source/% 
1986/87 - 1993/94
 a  20.1  4.1  -  -  14.5  15.9  46.9  12.7  14.8 
1993/94  - 1999/00
 a  14.7  10.5  23.8  27.6  16.8  11.3  10.5  4.4  9.9 
1999/00 - 2005/06  6.6  26.2  24.7  -2.8  19.6  15.5  2.6  18.7  14.1 
2005/06 – 2008/09
 h  10.4  11.0  11.2  -14.6  4.9  10.9  15.3  13.1  3.1 
Average annual real growth rates of revenue source/% 
1999/00 - 2005/06  0.13  18.6  17.2  -8.7  12.3  8.6  -3.6  11.5  7.3 
2005/06 – 2008/09
h  5.6  6.2  6.39  -18.3  0.37  6.1  10.3  8.2  -1.4 
Source: calculations based on National Treasury, Budget Review 2006 and other Budget Reviews. Real 
annual growth rates obtained using CPIX deflator (2000 = 100). CPIX projections for the MTEF period 
based on Budget Review 2005, page 12.  
Notes: 
a. Figures prior to 1995/96 include collections by the former TBVC states and self-governing 
territories. 
b. Average annual growth rates for retirement funds tax introduced in 1996/97, is from 1996/7-
1990/00. 
c
 Taxes on property includes donations tax, estate duty, marketable securities tax and transfer duties. 
d Including sales duty, replaced by general sales tax in July, 1978, and value added tax in Sept.,1991  
e
 Includes customs duties, import surcharges, diamond export duties, miscellaneous customs and excise 
income, as well as ordinary levy collections. 
f
 Including the former fuel levy directed to Regional Services Councils and the levy allocated to the 
National Road Fund for the period 1983/84 to 1986/87. 
g Including various levies, mining leases and ownership, cinematographic tax and other special levies, 
the skills development levy, specific and ad valorem taxes, and stamp duties and fees. 
h. MTEF period. 
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Table 3: Consolidated national, provincial and security fund (non-interest) expenditure by functional area 
  1997/98  1998/99  1999/00  2000/01  2002/03  2002/03  2003/04  2004/05  2005/06  2006/07*  2007/08*  2008/09*  1997/98-
1999/00 
1999/00  - 
2005/6 
2005/6  - 
2008/9* 
  Percentage of consolidated national and provincial expenditure  Real annual growth/% 
General govt services & unallocatable expend.  10.3  7.3  7.5  8  7.9  7.3  7.4  7.2  6.6  7.0  6.9  7.0  -17.3  5.7  8.6 
Protection services   18.9  20.2  20.0  21  21.2  20.8  19.7  19.1  19.2  18.0  17.6  17.2  -0.1  7.3  2.8 
Defence and intelligence   7.3  7.1  6.7  8  7.8  8.0  7.5  6.7  6.8  6.0  5.7  5.4  -6.5  8.4  -1.3 
Police   7.8  8.5  8.5  8  8.4  8.1  7.9  8.0  8.0  7.8  7.7  7.6  1.1  6.9  4.8 
Prisons   2.4  3.1  3.0  3  3.1  2.9  2.7  2.7  2.6  2.5  2.5  2.4  9.1  4.9  3.9 
Justice  1.4  1.5  1.7  2  1.9  1.9  1.7  1.7  1.8  1.7  1.7  1.8  8.8  8.7  6.7 
Social services   59.9  61.2  60.5  59  57.3  57.4  58.7  59.2  59.3  59.2  59.5  59.5  -2.6  7.8  6.8 
Education   27.2  26.9  26.6  26  24.7  23.5  23.2  22.5  21.7  20.9  20.9  20.7  -4.1  3.9  5.0 
Health   13.9  14.6  14.3  14  13.7  13.0  12.8  12.6  12.4  12.1  12.0  11.8  -1.6  5.2  4.8 
Social security and welfare   14.3  15.1  14.9  15  14.3  16.0  17.2  18.6  19.3  18.6  18.5  18.5  -1.1  14.1  5.0 
Housing  4.2  3.9  2.1  2  1.9  2.1  2.0  1.9  2.0  2.1  2.3  2.3  -31.0  6.8  11.3 
Community development  0.0  0.0  2.7  2  2.7  2.9  3.5  3.7  3.9  5.6  5.9  6.3    16.5  25.7 
Other  0.4  0.7  0.0  0  –  –  –  –  –  –  –  –       
Economic services   10.9  11.3  12.0  12  13.7  14.4  14.2  14.4  14.9  15.7  15.9  16.3  1.6  13.0  9.7 
Water schemes and related services   1.5  1.7  1.6  2  1.8  1.8  1.8  1.7  1.6  1.6  1.6  1.7  0.6  8.0  9.5 
Fuel and energy   0.3  0.2  0.2  0  0.6  0.7  0.6  0.6  0.7  0.7  0.7  0.7  -21.3  41.7  6.9 
Agriculture, forestry and fishing   2.2  2.3  2.2  2  2.1  2.0  2.1  2.1  2.2  2.5  2.6  2.5  -3.4  8.5  11.3 
Mining,  manufacturing and construction  0.7  0.7  0.7  1  0.5  0.4  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5  -2.8  4.4  3.5 
Transport and communication   4.4  4.6  4.9  5  5.2  5.4  5.2  5.3  5.2  6.1  6.2  6.4  1.8  9.5  14.3 
Other economic services   1.9  1.7  2.5  3  3.5  4.2  4.1  4.3  4.7  4.2  4.2  4.4  12.0  22.7  4.5 
Subtotal: Votes and statutory amounts   100.0  100.0  100.0  100  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  -3.0  8.2  6.6 
Total non-interest expenditure                          -3.0  8.2  7.1 
Interest                           -0.2  -4.5  -1.6 
Total consolidated expenditure                          -2.5  6.2  6.2 
Source: National Treasury, Budget Review 2006 and other Budget Reviews. Real annual growth rates obtained using CPIX deflator (2000 = 100). CPIX projections for the MTEF period based 
on Budget Review 2005, page 12. The MTEF period is indicated by a * on the date. 